Deterence

Interesting article.... Can agree with a number of points however the author fails to recognize that in an all-out nuclear war, will involve more nations than just the US and Russia. He is very simplistic in his assessment that the missiles were never meant to be launched along with his naive assessment that since the risk of an accidental launch is not absolutely “zero”, then US missiles should be put out of commission. He does not acknowledge and thus dismisses the number of checks /balances in place to preclude such an event. These checks /balances are in place for all US nuclear weapon systems. Consider the fact that there are a number of active sites spread out all over the western US as a huge deterrent yet is not acknowledged by this author either. It must be noted that these missile bases could be next to Chicago, NY, Washington D.C. Dallas, LA, etc. but the initial basing decisions were implemented trying to save lives conveniently forgotten in the article.

Understand the woulda, coulda, shoulda, Monday morning QB of the decisions initially made in the late 1950s and early 1960s regarding the basing of these missiles, but would those decisions be different today? If the US was willing let’s say to double or triple the sub-boomer fleet, axing the land based ICBMs might have merit. However, once the US broke the code on MIRV, we negotiated away this advantage placing limits on the affected warheads. The US applied this technology to both land and sub based missiles. Open press reports that US missiles have 3 MIRV on each Minuteman and the latest Trident series carries more but the number is not acknowledged. We "trust" that the Russians are doing the same although their technology for MIRV (at least initially) was far behind ours. They were basically one missile, one warhead. Of course the Russians backed out of the treaty that limited MIRV back in 2002 or so and a reasonable person might assume that the technology gap had closed. Who knows now what they have done with their current crop of missiles. And, oh by the way, missile subs are not cheap and the logistical tail is long so the cost savings would be negligible if any. Lastly, one must wonder what knife fights would happen in the Pentagon should the Air Force be relieved of the ground based ICBM force.

The US is already neutered the bomber fleet when compared to what had numbers were (both bombers and weapons systems carried by manned bombers) back in the 60s and 70s. One could argue that the US standoff missiles carried by the now limited bomber force are more accurate, mo' bettah, whatever... but they no longer pull no notice alert and are fixed in a very limited number of bases unlike years ago. The bomber bases I think now can be counted with one hand (5?). One could surmise that these bomber bases and the boomer bases (Kings Bay GA, and Bangor WA) will be the first hit and especially so in a no notice first strike surprise attack. The bases closest to the coasts will be quickly hit by sea-skimming cruise missiles and thus the surprise will be quick but deadly. If the initial nuke explosion doesn't destroy everything, the residual radiation will kill off the personnel in short order thus knocking the base(s) out of commission. The only credible deterrent we have for a no notice quick strike scenario is retaliate via the boomers on patrol. Of the 18 Ohio class in service, 4 were modified to carry cruise missiles. Of the 14 left that carry the Trident, only a few are at sea any given moment, others are either in normal maintenance or going thru refit either getting ready for sea or just getting back from patrol. Even with 24 missiles per sub and a handful of MIR per missile, these numbers are extremely limited.

One of the other items not mentioned in the article is that the continual upgrading and technology advances in missiles, pay dividends for the use of missiles for peaceful means such as placing satellites into orbit or back in the day, sending astronauts into space (remember that John Glenn and a couple of others went up on a modified Atlas ICBM). Not realized is that many of the satellites the US put into space currently are through the re-utilization of ex-ICBM platforms taken out of service.

If you open this in html, there are other links the author used to prop up his article.

Welcome to America’s ‘Nuclear Sponge’

By Tom Z. Collina Read bio <http://www.defenseone.com/voices/tom-z-collina/7829/?oref=d-article-author>

February 3, 2017

Nuclear missile sites are scattered across the American heartland, like this ICBM launch site in Minot, N.D.

If ICBMs are meant to draw enemy missiles toward American soil, it’s time to rethink our nuclear strategy.

The United States currently deploys hundreds of nuclear missiles across Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Each missile carries a nuclear payload many times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people. The Pentagon is now planning to build a new, deadlier generation of these missiles, which are housed in underground silos.

But these intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, are not meant to be launched, ever. Not even in a nuclear war. Their primary mission is to be destroyed in the ground, along with all the people that live anywhere near them. Their main purpose is to “absorb” a nuclear attack from Russia, acting as a giant “nuclear sponge <https://www.dsiac.org/resources/journals/dsiac/winter-2017-volume-4-number-1/mxpeacekeeper-and-sicbm-search-survivable> .” Such is the twisted logic of atomic warfare.

But it never made sense to draw a nuclear attack toward the United States, rather than away from it. Even during the Cold War, analysts challenged <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/07/24/fresh-challenge-voiced-to-missile-shell-game/7b2f8ae3-0109-43e3-a6bd-2bc04c56f6c8/?utm_term=.a13af5514cd4> this plan, claiming it was “madness to use United States real estate as ‘a great sponge to absorb’ Soviet nuclear weapons.”

Yet the nuclear sponge is still with us. Not only that, the Trump administration is planning to spend $100 billion <https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_10/News/Price-Tag-Rising-for-Planned-ICBMs> to do it all over again.

Newly minted Defense Secretary Jim Mattis defended the ICBM and the nuclear sponge mission, although he did not call it that. Testifying <http://www.defensenews.com/articles/mattis-enthusiastic-on-icbms-tepid-on-nuclear-cruise-missile?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWVRabFpqVTBNemszT0RWbSIsInQiOiJhaDhFaXdndE1tWjNnc3NwblkwWWNTWFJ2elgxZzJLVElUTFhUOWtNa3ZQbmhkdXlUd0srU0FjeEtuYzVSSlJPNDUyaDRsVkNzK0JsNG5XVnJVblllcUQ0TDY3bmpud1wvWXZ6OVBwaGMxMlEwWHN3UTFvOVgyMWhmTzd6dFh5SisifQ%3D%3D> before the Senate on Jan. 12, Mattis said, “It’s clear they are so buried out in the central U.S. that any enemy that wants to take us on is going to have to commit two, three, four weapons to make sure they take each one out. In other words, the ICBM force provides a cost-imposing strategy on an adversary.”

Related: Making America’s ICBMs Great Again <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/01/making-americas-icbms-great-again/135024/?oref=d1-related-article>

And: Despite Objections, Pentagon Takes Step Toward Buying New Nuclear Weapons <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/07/despite-objections-pentagon-takes-step-toward-buying-new-nuclear-weapons/130355/?oref=d1-related-article>

Cost-imposing for whom? Yes, attacking U.S. ICBMs would be very costly for Russia, mainly because the United States would retaliate with hundreds of nuclear weapons launched from submarines at sea. But what about the costs to Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming? Of course we want to prevent nuclear war, but do we need to throw the upper Midwest under the bus to do it?

No, we do not. In fact, the five ICBM states and the entire country would be better off if we did not have ICBMs at all. They are expensive, redundant, and above all, dangerous.

The United States can safely phase out the existing ICBMs without replacing them. This would save a boatload of money and take the missile states out of the crosshairs. And, as former Defense Secretary Bill Perry has written <http://www.ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/phase-out-americas-icbms> , it would also address the concern that ICBMs “could trigger an accidental nuclear war.”

Last year, before he became defense secretary, Mattis asked <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mattis_01-27-15.pdf> if it was time to remove the land-based missiles, as “This would reduce the false alarm danger.”

What are Perry and Mattis talking about? Nothing less than a nuclear nightmare, in which atomic weapons are used by mistake.

U.S. land-based missiles are highly vulnerable. They sit out in the open and everyone, including Vladimir Putin, knows exactly <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-30_Minuteman#/media/File:Active_LGM-30_Minuteman_Sites.png> where they are. So if Russia attacks them (no other country could), President Trump has only two options: launch the missiles before the attack arrives (and destroy Russia), or wait and let them be destroyed in the ground. Either way, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming are toast.

But here is the rub: President Trump would have about 10 minutes to make this fate-of-the-world decision. And the only sane decision is not to launch. Why? Because there is no way to know for sure (and you want to be sure) that the feared Russian attack is real.

There have been at least three false alarms in the United States that could have led to a mistaken nuclear war. Forty years ago, Perry himself was awakened in the middle of the night and told that Pentagon computers were showing 200 ICBMs on their way from the Soviet Union. Luckily, it was not the end of the world, but just a computer glitch.

How would President Trump respond if he were told at 3 a.m. that hundreds of Russian nuclear missiles were landing in minutes? Would he have the temperament to realize that it could be a false alarm, or would he impulsively launch a counter attack? No one else has the authority to make this call, and once the missiles fly they cannot be called back.

It is shocking that senior officials in the nuclear weapons business do not take the risk of false alarms seriously. They reassure us <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/01/making-americas-icbms-great-again/135024/?oref=d-river&&&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief> that the chance of a false alarm is “at an all-time low” and that “the statistical probability that the United States would launch ICBMs as a result of a false alarm is close to zero.” Such language is dangerously irresponsible. One can imagine the same bromides being used before the Titanic sank or the Space Shuttle exploded.

The honest truth is that the probability is low but not zero. And the consequences would be astronomical. When it comes to nuclear weapons, it only takes one. Human errors and machine errors do occur. It is only a matter of time before the odds add up to a catastrophic failure. As Perry writes, “we do not have to take that terrible risk anymore. We should not rebuild our ICBM arsenal.”

Moreover, ICBMs are redundant. The United States is rebuilding its nuclear-armed submarines that can hide under the oceans, able to survive a Russian nuclear attack. That is all we need to keep Moscow in check. In the unlikely event that new threats emerge that could put the subs at risk, the Air Force is rebuilding the insurance policy: nuclear-capable bombers. The ICBMs are an extra insurance policy that we can do without.

Which brings us back to Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. There is no good reason why these fine states should have a larger nuclear target on them than other states. It’s time to get rid of ICBMs, and throw away the nuclear sponge.

.